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Supreme Court Opinions and Audiences 
Ryan C. Black,* Ryan J. Owens,** Justin Wedeking*** 
& Patrick C. Wohlfarth**** 
For thousands of years, audiences have influenced how speakers 
and writers behave. The ancient Greeks often had to mollify their 
audiences before they could even begin to perform on stage. The 
Romans delivered the spectacle of gladiators, knowing that their 
audiences wanted to see battle and victory.1 Likewise, literary giant 
Ernest Hemingway famously said: “Show the readers everything, tell 
them nothing.”2 Audiences similarly influence today’s speakers and 
writers. Multi-national corporations, teachers, and even Supreme 
Court Justices must consider how audiences will react to their 
decisions. 
Supreme Court Justices write opinions to explain their legal 
conclusions, and these opinions are critiqued, and applied, by various 
audiences. Unlike members of Congress or the president, Justices 
write and publish the reasons for their decisions. They explain why 
one party wins a case and why another loses. Audiences read their 
opinions for guidance as to what the law permits them to do. They 
also read them to determine whether the Court’s decisions are well-
reasoned. They read them to determine how they can follow them. 
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 1 See generally CARLIN A. BARTON, THE SORROWS OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS: THE 
GLADIATOR AND THE MONSTER (1993). 
 2  PAULA MUNIER, PLOT PERFECT. HOW TO BUILD UNFORGETTABLE STORIES SCENE BY 
SCENE, BLUE ASH: WRITERS’S DIGEST 51 (2014).  
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And sometimes, they read the Court’s opinions to see whether and 
how they can ignore them. 
Justices, like everyone else, have audiences who can influence 
their decisions. Sometimes the Justices placate their audiences. 
Sometimes they speak directly to them. Sometimes they try to find 
ways to get around them. Pushing too far in one direction might 
provoke backlash among important legal and political audiences. 
Failing to appreciate the capabilities of other audiences may lead to 
unrealized goals. Simply put, the audience—its capabilities and 
desires—should always weigh on Justices’ minds. 
Our recent book, U.S. Supreme Court Opinions and Their 
Audiences, examines this “audience effect” on the Supreme Court.3 
We wanted to determine whether various audiences might influence 
how Justices write their opinions. Our central claim is that Justices 
work with (or around) their audiences instrumentally to achieve their 
broader goals. The point is worth repeating: we believe Justices write 
their opinions strategically so as to achieve their goals in the face of 
audiences who agree and disagree with those goals. We analyzed four 
primary audiences (while recognizing that there are likely others): 
lower federal courts, state governments, federal bureaucratic 
agencies, and the mass public. We discovered that Justices 
strategically anticipate their audiences when they write majority 
opinions. They write clearer opinions when doing so will help them 
to achieve their goals. When they believe their relevant audiences 
might choose not to comply faithfully with their decisions, they write 
clearer opinions so as to incentivize compliance (or dissuade 
noncompliance) by making the detection of noncompliance easy. 
When they believe their relevant audience might not be able to 
comply fully with their decisions, they write clearer opinions so as to 
assist with compliance. And, Justices also write clearer opinions to 
protect the Court’s institutional support. Their opinions, in short, are 
a function of their goals, conditioned by their audiences’ 
 
 3 Id. 
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Document7  12/22/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Supreme Court Opinions and Audiences 171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
characteristics. 
In what follows, we begin by briefly describing how we examine 
the Court’s opinions. We focus on opinion clarity and how the clarity 
(or, readability as we measure it) of an opinion changes as a function 
of the Court’s audiences. Next, we break down how the Court’s 
opinions change based on audiences. We conclude with a brief 
summary of our findings and a discussion about how personal goals 
might also influence how judges and Justices behave. 
OPINION CLARITY 
To examine whether the Court’s intended audiences influence 
how Justices write their opinions, we focused on the clarity of the 
Court’s opinions. That is, we examined whether there are conditions 
that influence how clearly the Justices write their opinions. Do they 
write clear and easily understandable opinions or do they write 
unclear and difficult to understand opinions? This is a difficult 
concept to measure, to be sure. But, we derived a measure based on 
our theory that Justices will use opinion clarity to enhance 
compliance with their rulings by assisting external actors with 
compliance or making the detection of noncompliance easy.  
More specifically, to measure the clarity of the Court’s opinions 
we examined rhetorical clarity through text readability. Textual 
readability is generally defined as the ease with which a layperson 
can read and understand the superficial language of the Court’s 
opinions.  Text readability scores offer “quantitative, objective 
estimates of the difficulty of reading selected prose.”  There are 
dozens of text readability formulas that estimate the readability of a 
text and these measures were created originally to establish the 
appropriate reading level for school textbooks.  Today, however, 
people use text readability scores to measure the degree of difficulty 
in reading a broad array of texts.  For example, insurance companies 
and government agencies are often required by law to employ these 
measures to enhance the general readability of the documents they 
generate.  As we apply the scores, they measure the difficulty a 
general reader is likely to encounter when reading a Court opinion. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The readability formulas generate their measures of clarity by 
examining some combination of the number of words, number of 
sentences, number of characters, and number of syllables. In 
numerous studies, these surface characteristics are shown to capture 
the substantive clarity (or readability) of a text.  For our purposes, in 
choosing a readability formula to estimate the “readability” of a 
Court opinion, we did not want to pick one or two measures 
arbitrarily. Rather, we used a combination of twenty-eight different 
readability measures to capture the commonality of their varied 
approaches in one measure. Hence, for each opinion we estimated a 
readability score that encapsulated the many different approaches to 
measuring textual clarity. Importantly, we then validated our measure 
by having humans read different segments of opinion text and asked 
them to rate the clarity of the text. We found a significant correlation 
between our measure and human’s rating of its readability. This 
allowed us to use statistical analysis to analyze the conditions under 
which justices write more or less readable opinions. 
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND OPINION CLARITY 
The Supreme Court sits atop the federal judicial hierarchy. Once 
the Supreme Court resolves a legal question, lower federal courts 
must apply the Court’s decision. The lower courts are supposed to 
interpret and apply the Court’s decisions faithfully. Nevertheless, 
lower court judges often have their own goals—goals that can 
diverge from those of the Supreme Court. And sometimes they 
pursue their own goals at the expense of the Supreme Court. As a 
consequence, Justices know that when they write opinions, lower 
court judges might try to circumvent them.  
So, Justices seek to enhance lower court compliance by writing 
clearer opinions—especially when they face lower court judges who 
are ideologically distant from them.  But why? How can opinion 
clarity help enhance compliance and dissuade non-compliance? 
When the High Court crafts a clear opinion, it accomplishes a few 
things. First, it makes it easier for friendly judges to follow those 
decisions faithfully.  (Anyone who has ever had to put together a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/17
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children’s swing set knows the value of clear instructions.) Second, a 
clear opinion can constrain unfriendly lower court judges by making 
it easier for the parties and other interested observers to detect lower 
court noncompliance.  In other words, a clearer opinion helps people 
to “blow the whistle” on lower courts who circumvent the Supreme 
Court. The parties can petition the High Court to hear cases involving 
those wayward courts, and the Court can publicly rebuke the lower 
courts for their recalcitrance. For example, in Hutto v. Davis,  the 
Supreme Court scolded a lower court for “having ignored, 
consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court 
system,” stating further: “unless we wish anarchy to prevail within 
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be 
followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the 
judges of those courts may think it to be.”  
We also considered whether Justices write clearer opinions to 
foster lower court uniformity and to help prevent conflict before it 
occurs. Justices should write clearer opinions when the federal 
circuits are more divided ideologically from one another, as lower 
courts are more likely to conflict with each other when they are 
heterogeneous. Consistent with our intuitions, we find empirical 
support for both expectations.  That is, Justices are more likely to 
write clearer opinions when the federal circuits become increasingly 
distant from the Supreme Court ideologically, and they write clearer 
opinions when the circuits are more heterogeneous and ideologically 
scattered. For example, when the average among the circuits moves 
from very close to the Court to very ideologically distant from the 
Court, the Justices write opinions that are roughly 0.65 units clearer 
on the readability scale. Some particular circuits that are highly 
distant from the Court can generate a readability change that is 
roughly 0.8 units clearer. And while this may not seem at first glance 
like a large change, we show in the book that even these changes are 
indeed noticeable.   
FEDERAL AGENCIES AND OPINION CLARITY 
We next analyzed whether justices write clearer opinions when 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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they decide cases dealing with federal agencies. Over 22% of the 
Supreme Court’s 1641 decisions during the 1946 through 2012 Court 
terms involved disputes that originated in federal administrative 
agencies.4 Just as lower courts have ways to circumvent High Court 
decisions, so too do agencies.5 And sometimes these agencies defy 
the Court—or at least do as much as they can to skirt the Court’s 
rulings.6 
Agency characteristics might lead an agency to be more (or less) 
likely to defy the Court. For example, some agencies are more 
competent and professional. These agencies, often well-funded, have 
large staffs and professionalized legal advisors. Other agencies, 
however, are less competent and professionalized. They have small 
budgets, can afford to hire only a small staff, and may not even have 
effective legal advisors. In short, some agencies have the capacity 
and the motive to shirk High Court rulings.7 
Knowing this, Justices occasionally will make it more difficult for 
agencies to shirk or misapply their rulings. They are likely to write 
clearer opinions when dealing with less competent agencies. Doing 
so, again, allows the Justices to detect noncompliance more easily, 
and it makes it harder as a textual matter for the agency to shirk the 
Court.8 
 Using data from the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
created by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),9 we were 
 
 4 To generate this number, we looked to the Supreme Court Database adminAction 
variable. We excluded instances where the administrative agency was established under an 
interstate compact (adminAction=65) and those that involved a state agency 
(adminAction=117) as well as those cases where there was no administrative action 
preceding the case (adminAction=124). Cases included were decided during the 1946 
through 2012 Court terms. Data include orally argued signed, and per curiam opinions and 
judgments of the Court. Data exclude original jurisdiction cases. 
 5 James F. Spriggs II, The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A 
Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1996). 
 6 Id. See also James F. Spriggs II, Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with 
Supreme Court Opinions, 50(3) POL. RES. Q. 567 (1997).  
 7 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
 8 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
 9 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3 (chapter 5). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/17
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able to create an indicator of which agencies appeared to be more or 
less competent.10 OMB gave each agency program an overall grade 
that derived from four component grades. In a series of interviews 
with different agencies over time, OMB examiners asked agencies 
four categories of questions:11 
The purpose and design of specific programs (i.e., whether the 
program design and purpose was clear and defensible); 
The strategic planning that went to the long-term planning of the 
agency vis-a`-vis the program (i.e., whether the agency set long-term 
goals); 
• Program management (i.e., how well the programs were 
administered and overseen); 
The results of the program (i.e., rate the overall performance of 
goals met).12 
 
Interviewers asked their respondents a series of yes or no 
questions on each of these four dimensions. For example, if a 
respondent answered “yes” to 5 out of 10 questions in a category, the 
score for that category would be 50 out of 100.13 OMB then gave 
each agency program a score on each of these four dimensions. Then, 
it generated a weighted score (ranging from 0–100) for each program 
based on the four scores. Based on this final weighted score, 
programs received one of four possible ratings from OMB: 
ineffective (final scores from 0–49), adequate (final scores of 50–69), 
moderately effective (final scores of 70–84), or effective (final scores 
of 80–100).14 We examined the correlation between High Court 
 
 10 U.S. Off. Mgmt. & Budget, The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), 
EXPECTMORE.GOV, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2017).  
 11 DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL 
CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 174 (2008). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See John B. Gilmour & David E. Lewis, Assessing Performance Budgeting at OMB: 
The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
169, 179 (2005). 
 14 Id. 
• • 
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opinion clarity and agency competency. The results accord with our 
expectations. We discovered that Justices write opinions with a view 
toward an agency’s performance record as they issue a ruling 
contrary to that agency’s position. When the Court decides a case 
against a federal agency, the agency’s professionalism strongly 
predicts opinion clarity. When the Court rejects a highly professional 
agency, we estimate that its opinion has a readability score of around 
1.4, which is the 62nd percentile across all opinions in our data. 
When the Court rejects a highly unprofessional agency, however, the 
Court writes in a way that is significantly clearer.15 
STATES AND OPINION CLARITY 
We also considered how the characteristics of state governments 
might influence the clarity of the Court’s opinions. We focused on 
state legislative and gubernatorial professionalism. Specifically, we 
looked at whether Justices might write clearer opinions based on each 
state legislature’s degree of professionalization and each state 
governor’s institutional power rating. For three reasons, citizen 
legislatures are likely to be more problematic from the Supreme 
Court’s perspective than professional legislatures. First, the literature 
suggests citizen legislatures contain fewer “quality” members than 
professional legislatures.16 It also suggests citizen legislatures are 
more reliant on interest groups for information.17 Second, citizen 
legislatures may be more likely to pass anti-Court legislation than 
professionalized legislatures.18 Third, because they are smaller, 
citizen legislatures are likely to employ fewer “whistleblowers” who 
 
 15 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
 16 See, e.g., Peverill Squire, Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire 
Index Re-visited, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 211 (2007); David C. King et al., The Management 
Performance of the U.S. States (KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-028, 2004), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=571821 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.571821.  
 17 Michael B. Berkman, Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The 
Institutional Context of Interest Population Density, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 661 (2001).  
 18 William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of 
Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483 (2002). The states that attacked the 
Warren Court, as identified in the study, had less professionalized legislatures overall. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/17
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will stand up to, or point out, a state’s obstruction to High Court 
decisions.19 
Once again, the results for state legislative professionalism 
support our hypothesis. We discovered that the Court writes 
increasingly readable opinions when it rules in cases dealing with less 
professionalized state legislatures (we find no effects for the role of 
governors’ institutional powers). What is more, these effects are 
enhanced when the state government is controlled by the same 
party.20 In other words, when the state has both institutional 
limitations and political ability to fail to comply with the Court, 
Justices write clearer opinions. Doing so helps them, yet again, keep 
tabs on potentially wayward actors. 
THE PUBLIC AND OPINION CLARITY 
Do Justices change the clarity of their opinions when they face a 
public that is hostile to their general ideological tendencies? Though 
the general public is surely not as direct and immediate as the other 
audiences we considered, the public holds the key to the Court’s 
legitimacy. A public that supports the Court lends it legitimacy.  
Justices are likely to follow—or at least pay attention to—public 
opinion for two reasons. First, even though the Justices are not linked 
to the public through election, those who implement the Court's 
decisions are subject to elections. Justices who want to see policies 
effectuated must contemplate just how faithful the elected 
implementors will be. Those who are charged with implementing 
may not want to do so when dealing with a decision strongly contrary 
to public opinion. Second, the Court's legitimacy serves as the 
foundation of its support. As Justice Frankfurter once claimed: “The 
Court’s authority . . . rests on sustained public confidence in its moral 
sanction.21 A consistent pattern of shirking public opinion, though, 
 
 19 See generally James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, The Political Economy of 
Institutions and Corruption in American States, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 341 (2003). 
 20 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
 21 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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could damage the Court’s legitimacy.”22 Members of the public may 
respond negatively to Court decisions they dislike. Given that the 
Court's power ultimately comes from its legitimacy—and that 
sustained negative news and unpopular decisions can erode public 
support for the Court23—ustices should avoid calling that legitimacy 
into question. A Court that consistently rules against the public will 
surely see opposition grow. Knowing this, Justices are likely to want 
to dull the edge of decisions where they rule against public opinion.24 
In several studies,25 we examined this dynamic in two different 
ways. First, we identified polls that match public opinion to 
individual Supreme Court cases.26 That is, we used individual polls 
addressing issues featured in Supreme Court cases (before the Court 
decided them), and then determined whether the Court ruled for, or 
against, prevailing public sentiment on the issue. We then examined 
whether opinion clarity differed in counter-majoritarian decisions 
compared to those that conformed to prevailing popular sentiment. 
We discovered that when the Court ruled against the position a 
majority of Americans supported, it wrote a significantly clearer 
opinion. Doing so allows Justices to explain their position to the 
public—to tell the public why they ruled the way they did. For 
example, when the Court decides a case inconsistent with public 
opinion in a specific case, its opinion readability score is almost two 
units clearer than when it rules consistent with public opinion. As we 
state in the book, this is roughly the difference between an opinion in 
the 40th percentile (consistent with public opinion) and the 57th 
 
 22 Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public 
Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80(4) AM. POL. SCI REV. 1209 (1986).  
 23 Robert H. Durr, Andrew D. Martin & Christina Wolbrecht, Ideological Divergence 
and Public Support for the Supreme Court, 44(4) AM. J. POL. SCI. 768 (2000).  
 24 Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How Public Opinion  
Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55(1) AM. J. POL. SCI. 74 (2011).  
 25 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3; Ryan C. Black et al., The 
Influence of Public Sentiment on Supreme Court Opinion Clarity, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 703 
(2016). 
 26 THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); THOMAS 
R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/17
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percentile (inconsistent with public opinion) in terms of readability.27 
Second, we looked at the mass public’s general ideological 
mood—aggregate shifts in public opinion for or against “more” 
government—when the Court handed down its opinions and how that 
general mood predicted the average, term level clarity over time 
(with separate analyses for liberal and conservative Court opinions). 
If the public was generally liberal (conservative) but the Court ruled 
conservatively (liberally), its opinions were, again, clearer on average 
over time. 
COMPLIANCE AS A FUNCTION OF CLARITY 
Lastly, we test the major implication of our argument about 
whether opinion clarity can, in fact, enhance compliance. 
Specifically, we look at lower court compliance, using data from 
Shepard’s citations on how lower courts treat Supreme Court 
opinions.28 We examine whether the lower courts treated the 
Supreme Court’s opinion positively, negatively, or neutrally, an 
approach now standard in compliance studies. Using our measure of 
opinion clarity, and after controlling for a wide assortment of other 
factors that might also influence compliance (for example, the size of 
the majority coalition, ideological differences between the lower 
court and Supreme Court, case complexity, etc.) we find that when 
Justices write opinions that are more readable, then lower courts treat 
that opinion more positively (or less negatively). This confirms a 
strong link between opinion clarity and compliance.29 
DISCUSSION 
In our book, we examined just one important dimension—opinion 
clarity—to show how Justices deal instrumentally with audiences.30 
 
 27 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
 28 See Shepard’s Citation Services, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-
us/products/shepards.page. 
 29 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
 30 BLACK ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.3. 
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That is, we claim that Justices have goals and work with (or around) 
their audiences to achieve those goals by altering the clarity of their 
opinions. And the results accord with our expectations. Yet, that is 
not the end of it. Not by far. Justices have other means of modifying 
opinion language to address audience considerations. For example, 
Justices can adjust the amount of negative rhetoric in their opinions. 
In addition, Justices also have personal audiences that might 
influence Justices’ behavior. In his influential book, Judges and Their 
Audiences, Larry Baum focused on how personal audiences could 
influence judges’ behavior.31 He asked a number of questions: Would 
judges who value the esteem of lawyers change their behavior when 
the lawyerly class opposed overturning a precedent? Would judges 
who value the respect of interest groups render more conservative or 
liberal decisions than they otherwise might in order to retain those 
groups’ support? Would judges who value professional advancement 
change their behavior so as to get elevated?32 These questions are all 
important and deserving of attention. We did not examine them 
empirically in our book, but we suggest that others do. Doing so will 
help us to develop more realistic conceptions of judicial behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR (2006). 
 32 Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/17
Document7  12/22/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Supreme Court Opinions and Audiences 181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
